INABA Misato

Department of EconomicsLecturer

Last Updated :2024/10/10

■Researcher basic information

Researcher number

70793975

Research Keyword

  • 実験社会科学   公共財   制度   社会心理学   囚人のジレンマゲーム   規範   信頼   社会的知性   集団   協力   協力行動   社会的ジレンマ   社会的相互作用   間接互恵性   進化ゲーム理論   ゲーム理論   評判   社会系心理学   適応   利他行動   Linked-game   限定交換   一般交換   社会的交換   

Research Field

  • Humanities & social sciences / Social psychology

■Career

Career

  • 2022/04 - Today  Kindai UniversityFaculty of Economics講師
  • 2020/04 - 2022/03  Kindai UniversityFaculty of Economics Department of Economics特任講師
  • 2018/04 - 2020/03  日本学術振興会特別研究員PD
  • 2017/04 - 2018/03  Kansai UniversityThe Research Institute for Socionetwork Strategies (RISS)ポスト・ドクトラル・フェロー
  • 2013/04 - 2016/03  日本学術振興会特別研究員DC1

Educational Background

  • 2013/04 - 2016/09  Hokkaido University  Graduate School of Letters  人間システム科学専攻
  • 2011/04 - 2013/03  Hokkaido University  Graduate School of Letters  人間システム科学専攻
  • 2007/04 - 2011/03  Hokkaido University  Faculty of Letters  人文科学科

■Research activity information

Paper

  • Shinya Obayashi; Misato Inaba; Tetsushi Ohdaira; Toko Kiyonari
    Journal of Computational Social Science Springer Science and Business Media LLC 2432-2717 2023/09 
    Abstract This study estimated the effect of receiving help during a disaster on an individual’s subsequent cooperation for a common-pool resource. Such a chain of altruism is called generalized exchange and upstream indirect reciprocity in exchange and cooperation theories. Theoretical studies have pointed out its importance in understanding human cooperation in society. Some researchers on disaster have observed the phenomenon called “disaster area relay”, where disaster victims, having received help during the disaster they experienced, in turn, help victims of another subsequent disaster. However, there are few empirical and systematic analyses of this in actual societal events due to the causal problem. This paper attempted to overcome this problem through a quasi-experimental approach using big data. This paper focused on mutual cooperation through “Free Tank”, which is a common-pool resource in the online community called “mineo-KINGDOM”. The result of difference-in-differences estimation showed that receiving help during a disaster had a positive causal impact on subsequent cooperation for a common-pool resource and reciprocity norm. This result provides assurance that helping has a potential ripple effect on individuals’ cooperation.
  • Misato Inaba; Tetsuya Kawamura; Kazuhito Ogawa
    Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics Wiley 1370-4788 2023/04 [Refereed]
  • Yuta Kawamura; Misato Inaba
    Evolution and Human Behavior Elsevier BV 1090-5138 2023/04 [Refereed]
  • Tetsushi Ohdaira; Misato Inaba; Shinya Obayashi; Toko Kiyonari
    情報処理学会論文誌 情報処理学会 64 (2) 594 - 602 1882-7764 2022/11 [Refereed]
     
    本研究は,インターネット上の匿名コミュニティにおいて,いかにして協力的な集団が形成可能かという問いにアプローチするため,いわゆる格安スマホサービスmineo(マイネオ)の提供する「フリータンク」という,顧客同士が協力しあうことで通信パケット量を公共財化するサービスに着目する.最初に,顧客のフリータンクへの通信パケットの提供および引き出し双方の行動履歴データの分析を通して,通信パケットの提供と引き出しの分布に潜む規則性を見い出す.次に,その分布は顧客のどのような行動パターンにより生み出されているのかという疑問に対する説明をシミュレーション実験によって試みる.最後に,ごく一部のユーザによる余剰パケットの一部またはすべての提供によってフリータンクが維持されていることを示す. In this study, to approach the question of how a cooperative group can be formed in an anonymous community on the Internet, we focus on the service that customers can convert their packets into public goods by cooperating with each other, which is called “Free Tank” provided by the mineo, one of the low-cost cell phone service providers. Firstly, through the analysis of the behavior history data of customers regarding both the provision and withdrawal of packets to the Free Tank, we find the regularity hidden in the distribution of the provision and withdrawal of packets. Secondly, we try to explain the question of what kind of behavior patterns of customers creates such distribution by simulation experiments. Finally, this study shows that the Free Tank is maintained by some or all provision of surplus packets of a small number of customers.
  • Inaba, Misato; Obayashi, Shinya; Ohdaira, Tetsushi; Kiyonari, Toko
    Ikoma Journal of Economics 近畿大学経済学会 20 (1) 1 - 20 2433-3085 2022/07 
    type:Departmental Bulletin Paper [要旨]人間社会は昔から様々な形の社会的ジレンマに直面してきたが,現代社会においてはそこに参加する人数が増大している。本研究は,従来の社会的ジレンマ研究における知見が大規模化した社会的ジレンマに適用可能であるかを,現実社会に存在する社会的ジレンマのビッグデータを解析することで検討した。具体的には,日本の仮想移動体通信事業者であるオプテージが提供する「フリータンク」というシステムに着目した。フリータンクの分析の結果,規模が大きくなることで互恵的協力者が減少したことが明らかになった。また,協力を必要とする人がいることへの気づきが,協力行動を促進した。一方で,協力を募ることは,協力行動を促進する効果を持たなかった。[Abstract] Although human societies have faced various social dilemmas throughout history, the number of participants has become so large in modern societies. This study investigated whether the research findings on social dilemmas can be applied to largescale social dilemmas by analyzing big data on social dilemmas. Specifically, we focused on the "Free Tank" system developed by Optage, one of Japan's mobile virtual network operators. The analysis of Free Tank data revealed that the proportion of reciprocal cooperators decreased as the scale of the system increased. Additionally, the awareness of the need for cooperation increased cooperation. Conversely, solicitation for cooperation did not encourage cooperation.
  • Obayashi Shinya; Inaba Misato; Ohdaira Tetsushi; Kiyonari Toko
    Sociological Theory and Methods Japanese Association For Mathematical Sociology 37 (2) 156 - 169 0913-1442 2022 [Refereed]
  • Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi
    Games 10 (1) 10  2019/02 [Refereed]
  • Misato Inaba; Yumi Inoue; Satoshi Akutsu; Nobuyuki Takahashi; Toshio Yamagishi
    PLoS ONE Public Library of Science 13 (3) 1932-6203 2018/03 [Refereed]
     
    The accumulation of findings that most responders in the ultimatum game reject unfair offers provides evidence that humans are driven by social preferences such as preferences for fairness and prosociality. On the other hand, if and how the proposer’s behavior is affected by social preferences remains unelucidated. We addressed this question for the first time by manipulating the knowledge that the proposer had about the responder’s belief concerning the intentionality of the proposer. In a new game called the “ultimatum game with ambiguous intentions of the proposer (UGAMB),” we made the intentionality of the proposer ambiguous to the recipient. We expected and found that the proposer would make more unfair offers in this new game than in the standard ultimatum game. This expectation can be derived from either the preference-based model or the strategy model of the proposer’s giving decision. The additional finding that more unfair giving in the UGAMB was not mediated by the proposer’s expectation that the recipient would be more willing to accept unfair offers provided support for the preference-based model. Using a psychological measure of cognitive control, the preference-based model received additional support through a conceptual replication of the previous finding that cognitive control of intuitive drive for prosociality in the dictator game, rather than mind reading in the ultimatum game, is responsible for the difference in giving between the two games.
  • Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi
    Rationality and Society SAGE Publications Ltd 30 (1) 54 - 79 1461-7358 2018/02 [Refereed]
     
    How cooperation is possible has been one of the major puzzles in social sciences. Traditionally, two mechanisms have been proposed to explain cooperation. Cooperation in repeated dyadic interactions has been explained by direct reciprocity, while cooperation between more than two individuals has been explained by indirect reciprocity. Although reputation is theoretically unnecessary to achieve mutual cooperation in repeated dyadic interactions, several experimental studies indicated that people do make use of reputation even in such situations. Therefore, we conducted two experiments to investigate why people make use of reputation in dyadic interactions. Our results revealed that people use reputation because they assume that reputation enables them to predict their partners’ future behaviors in dyadic interactions. We conclude that there is a need to reexamine the system of mechanisms posited to explain the problem of cooperation in particular by expanding the scope of indirect reciprocity.
  • Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi; Hisashi Ohtsuki
    JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY ACADEMIC PRESS LTD- ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD 409 97 - 107 0022-5193 2016/11 [Refereed]
     
    One of the most well-known models to characterize cooperation among unrelated individuals is Social dilemma (SD). However there is no consensus about how to solve the SD by itself. Since SDs are often embedded in other social interactions, including indirect reciprocity games (IR), human can coordinate their behaviors across multiple games. Such coordination is called linkage'. Recently linkage has been considered as a promising solution to resolve SDs, since excluding SD defectors (i.e. those who defected in SD) from indirectly reciprocal relationships functions as a costless sanction. A previous study performed mathematical modeling and revealed that a linkage strategy, which cooperates in SD and engages in the Standing strategy in IR based on the recipients' behaviors in both SD and IR, was an ESS against a non-linkage strategy which defects in SD and engages in the Standing strategy in IR based on recipients' behaviors only in IR (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004). In order to investigate the robustness of the linkage strategy, we devised a non-linkage strategy, which cooperates in SD but does not link two games. First, we conducted a mathematical analysis and demonstrated that the linkage strategy was not an ESS against cooperating non-linkage strategy. Second, we conducted a series of agent-based computer simulations to examine how the strategies perform in situations in which various types of errors can occur. Our results showed that the linkage strategy was an ESS only when there are implementation errors in SD. However, the equilibrium of the linkage strategy was unstable when there are perception errors. Since we know that humans are not free from perception errors in their social life, future studies will need to show how perception errors can be overcome in order to provide support for the conclusion that linkage is a plausible solution to SDs. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi; Seina Katsuura
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD 51 27 - 27 0020-7594 2016/07 [Refereed]
  • Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi
    Shinrigaku Kenkyu Japanese Psychological Association 83 (1) 27 - 34 0021-5236 2012 
    Although social solidarity is an essential component that helps maintaining social order, what produces solidarity and how does it work have not been fully investigated. We conducted an experiment to examine whether experiencing different forms of social exchange produces different levels of solidarity. We compared four forms of social exchange: reciprocal exchange (exchange resources without negotiation), negotiated exchange (with negotiation), pure-generalized exchange (giver can choose who to give) and chaingeneralized exchange (giver cannot choose who to give). Two dimensions classify these exchanges: the number of players (two vs. more than two), and involvement of negotiation. Reciprocal and negotiated exchanges occur within dyads, while pure- and chain-generalized exchanges involve three or more players. Only the negotiated exchange involves negotiation process the other exchanges are purely unilateral giving. Participants played a one-shot social dilemma game (SDG) before and after social exchange session. The more the players cooperated in SDG, the stronger the social solidarity. Results show that the cooperation rate in SDG increased more in the reciprocal, pure- and chain-generalized exchange conditions than that in the negotiated exchange condition, suggesting that social solidarity is facilitated by experiencing social exchange which does not involve negotiation.

Books and other publications

  • 協力する種
    BOWLES Samuel; GINTIS Herbert (Joint translation5,6,8,9章)NTT出版 2017/01
  • 「社会のきまり」はどのように決まるか
    高橋伸幸; 稲葉美里 (Contributor規範はどのように実効化されるのか―実験的検討)勁草書房 2015/01
  • Dynamics of Learning in Neanderthals and Modern Humans. Vol.2. Cognitive and Physical Perspectives
    Takahashi, N; Hatano, A; Inaba, M; Onoda, R; Simunovic, D (ContributorSocial learning, trial-and-error, and creativity)Springer 2014

Lectures, oral presentations, etc.

  • Cooperation in Nested Social Dilemmas: The Role of Pooled Punishment  [Not invited]
    Misato Inaba; Yoko Kitakaji
    The 20th International Conference on Social Dilemmas  2024/07
  • 公共財問題における内生的な制度形成の効果  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 川村哲也; 小川一仁
    日本社会心理学会第59回大会  2018/08  追手門学院大学
  • Second-Order Reputation in a Linked game  [Not invited]
    Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi
    The 30th Annual Meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society  2018/07  Amsterdam
  • Voting with their feet promotes mutual cooperation  [Not invited]
    Nobuyuki Takahashi; Misato Inaba
    日独社会科学学会  2018/03  Osnabrueck
  • 格差が社会関係資本に与える影響  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸; 犬塚敦也
    日本社会心理学会第58回大会  2017/10  広島大学
  • 連結による協力問題の解決 −評判を用いることの適応価の解明−  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里
    日本心理学会第81回大会  2017/09  久留米シティプラザ
  • Which type of sanctioning institution is the most attractive and effective?  [Not invited]
    Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi; Seina Katsuura
    The 17th International Conference on Social Dilemmas  2017/06  Taormina
  • フィールドにおけるサンクショナーに対する評価  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸; 宮崎梨奈
    日本人間行動進化学会第9回大会  2016/12  金沢文化ホール
  • サンクション制度への自発的参加と効果の比較  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸; 勝浦聖奈
    日本社会心理学会第57回大会  2016/09  関西学院大学
  • Voluntary formation of sanctioning institutions in social dilemmas and their effectiveness  [Not invited]
    Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi; Seina Katsuura
    The 31st International Congress of Psychology  2016/07  Yokohama
  • Direct exchange or indirect exchange; which exchange enables the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas?  [Not invited]
    Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi
    The 28th Annual Meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society  2016/06  Vancouver
  • 社会的交換と社会的ジレンマの連結に基づく選別的利他行動の進化条件  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸
    日本人間行動進化学会第8回大会  2015/12  総合研究大学院大学
  • The role of psychological inference on the promotion of promiscuous trust.  [Not invited]
    Nobuyuki Takahashi; Misato Inaba; Ryoichi Onoda; Yuta Takekawa
    The 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas  2015/06  Hong Kong
  • Under what conditions can a linkage strategy lead to mutual cooperation?  [Not invited]
    Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi
    The 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas  2015/06  Hong Kong
  • Robustness of linkage strategy which leads to mutual cooperation  [Not invited]
    Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi
    The 27th Annual Meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society  2015/05  Columbia
  • 連結戦略によって社会的ジレンマでの協力は達成されるか?−Panchanathan & Boyd (2004)の進化シミュレーションによる追試−  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸
    日本人間行動進化学会第7回大会  2014/11  神戸大学
  • 高機会コスト社会への適応戦略としての防衛的悲観主義  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸; 鈴木唯
    日本グループ・ダイナミックス学会第61回大会  2014/09  東洋大学
  • 評判が用いられる状況の特性  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸
    日本社会心理学会第55回大会  2014/07  北海道大学
  • 社会的交換場面での行動決定における評判利用の抑制  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸
    日本人間行動進化学会第6回大会  2013/12  広島修道大学
  • 社会的交換場面における行動決定に評判が与える影響  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸
    日本社会心理学会第54回大会  2013/11  沖縄国際大学
  • Social learning, trial-and-error, and creativity  [Not invited]
    Nobuyuki Takahashi; Ayaka Hatano; Misato Inaba; Ryoichi Onoda; Dora Simunovic
    International Conference on Replacement of Neanderthals by Modern Humans: Testing Evolutionary Models of Learning  2013/11  Tokyo
  • Psychological processes of linkage between social dilemmas and social exchange  [Not invited]
    Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi
    The 15th International Conference on Social Dilemmas  2013/07  Zurich
  • Why do people selectively give benefits to cooperators in SD?  [Not invited]
    Nobuyuki Takahashi; Misato Inaba
    The 25th Annual Meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society  2013/07  Miami
  • 印象形成によるゲーム間の連結  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸
    日本人間行動進化学会第5回大会  2012/12  東京大学
  • 社会的ジレンマと繰り返し囚人のジレンマの連結メカニズム  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸
    第16回 実験社会科学カンファレンス  2012/12  青山学院大学
  • ゲーム間連結行動の心理メカニズム  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸
    日本社会心理学会第53回大会  2012/11  筑波大学
  • 行動履歴が非対称である場合のゲーム間連結行動  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸
    日本グループ・ダイナミックス学会第59回大会  2012/09  京都大学
  • Do people link a prisoner's dilemma game with a social dilemma game even when only they know their partners' behaviors in SD?  [Not invited]
    Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi
    The 24th Annual Meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society  2012/06  Albuquerque
  • Are sanctioners selected as leaders?  [Not invited]
    Nobuyuki Takahashi; Misato Inaba; Ayaka Hatano; Ryoichi Onoda
    The 24th Annual Meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society  2012/06  Albuquerque
  • 社会的ジレンマにおけるサンクショニングメカニズムの4形態  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸; 中川遥
    グローバルCOE「心の社会性に関する教育研究拠点」総括シンポジウム  2012/03  学術総合センター
  • 怒りの適応的基盤−怒りが高評価につながる状況の探索的研究−  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸
    日本人間行動進化学会第4回大会  2011/11  北海道大学
  • 怒りへの評価に影響を与える状況要因の探索的研究  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸
    日本心理学会第75回大会  2011/09  日本大学文理学部
  • 社会的ジレンマにおけるサンクショニングメカニズムの4形態  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸; 中川遥
    日本社会心理学会第52回大会  2011/09  名古屋大学
  • 人間関係における資源投資戦略の国際比較  [Not invited]
    高橋伸幸; 稲葉美里; Willer Robb; Barclay Pat
    日本社会心理学会第52回大会  2011/09  名古屋大学
  • 交換形態が社会的連帯に与える影響の比較  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸
    日本グループ・ダイナミックス学会第58回大会  2011/08  昭和女子大学
  • Comparison of the effects of exchange form on social solidarity  [Not invited]
    Misato Inaba; Nobuyuki Takahashi
    The 23rd Annual Meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society  2011/06  Montpellier
  • Comparison of four types of sanctioning mechanism  [Not invited]
    Nobuyuki Takahashi; Misato Inaba; Haruka Nakagawa
    The 23rd Annual Meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society  2011/06  Montpellier
  • 交換形態が社会的連帯に及ぼす影響  [Not invited]
    稲葉美里; 高橋伸幸
    日本人間行動進化学会第3回大会  2010/12  神戸大学

Courses

  • Social psychologySocial psychology Kindai University
  • Cognitive psychologyCognitive psychology Kindai University
  • Economic psychologyEconomic psychology Kindai University

Affiliated academic society

  • THE JAPANESE GROUP DYNAMICS ASSOCIATION   日本人間行動進化学会   THE JAPANESE SOCIETY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY   THE JAPANESE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION   

Research Themes

  • 集団を超えた協力:期待と行動が生み出すダイナミズムの解明
    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science:Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
    Date (from‐to) : 2019/04 -2023/03 
    Author : 稲葉 美里
  • 性感染症に関する知識の普及と定着を促す介入方法の検討-フィールドと実験室の融合-
    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science:Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
    Date (from‐to) : 2018/04 -2021/03 
    Author : 小川 一仁; 川村 哲也; 長塚 昌生; 稲葉 美里; 本西 泰三
     
    本研究プロジェクトでは性感染症の知識増進を進めるためのフィールド実験を実施することを目指している。2018年度は、その第一歩として、予備調査を行う年度である。そのため、性感染症に関する知識を大学生がどの程度有しているかを確認するためのアンケート調査を設計・実施した。設計は18年度前期に行った。アンケートの内容としては、回答者の性別、性感染症に関する知識を問う質問、リスク態度に関する質問などである。質問内容が性感染症ということで、回答に関してはプライバシーが守られること、回答したくない場合には白紙のまま提出してもかまわないことを徹底した。 アンケート調査の実施校は大阪学院大学(分担者の長塚が担当)、関西大学(代表の小川および分担者の本西が担当)である。回答者はそれぞれの大学の学部生である。具体的には大阪学院大学は主に経済学部生、関西大学は経済学部生と、本学経済実験センターで実施している経済実験の参加者であった。実施時期は2018年10月から2019年3月で、有効回答数としておよそ300名のデータが集まった。18年度中にデータ入力をほぼ完了し、分析に入るところまで進んだ。 同時に性感染症の行動経済学的分析に関する内外の文献調査を実施し、関連する研究の整理を行った(代表の小川および分担者の川村・稲葉が担当)。整理の結果は予備調査にも反映されているだけでなく、今後実施される介入実験の設計にも資するものと考えられる。
  • 日本学術振興会:特別研究員奨励費
    Date (from‐to) : 2018/04 -2020/03 
    Author : 稲葉 美里
  • 日本学術振興会:特別研究員奨励費
    Date (from‐to) : 2013/04 -2016/03 
    Author : 稲葉 美里